Abstract. Notions of context for natural language interpretation are factored in terms of three processes: translation, entailment and attunement. The processes are linked by accessibility relations of the kind studied in many-dimensional modal logic, modulo complications from constraints between translation and entailment (violations in which may trigger re-attunement) and from refinement and underspecification.
Introduction
It is familiar practice in semantics to encode context as a sequence, selected components of which can be varied while others are held constant. The indexical now was, for instance, brought into temporal logic in [Kam71] via an early form of multi-dimensional modal logic (e.g. [MV97] ). And to treat presupposition, [Sta78] injected content into context, feeding the development of "dynamic" approaches to semantics such as Discourse Representation Theory (DRT). The present work is motivated largely by what is identified in [Kam90] as "the principal challenge to DRT" -viz. "the exact formulation of the construction algorithm" which takes syntactic analyses of English sentences and returns logical forms. Our emphasis, however, is not so much on any particular kind of syntactic analysis or (target) logical form as it is on the incrementality and non-determinism of some such algorithm. That incrementality and nondeterminism are analyzed by bringing out contextual parameters that condition processing.
Background: translation and entailment
To fix notation, let E be the set of inputs to the algorithm and Φ be the set of outputs. Without making any assumptions about E or Φ, let us form the set
of pairs ( e, ϕ) of input and output sequences. These i/o pairs can be construed as stages of a translation process insofar as every pair 
where for every e ∈ E,
The existence of the transition sequence (1) can be simplified to the requirement that Stage be prefix-closed -i.e., whenever ( ee, ϕϕ) ∈ Stage, ( e, ϕ) ∈ Stage.
The transitions e → are worth isolating, however, to examine context, the semantic component of which is given by a notion of entailment
(which presumably is the point behind passing from E to Φ). Together, a translation-entailment pair (Stage, | −) provides an interpretation of a modal language L • consisting of formulas A generated according to That "ê presupposes there is a king of Buganda" can then be stated as
where '∃KoB' ∈ Φ asserts there is a king of Buganda. Moreover, the negation test becomes the L • -formula
(where¬ is a connective in E, not L • ), while the presupposition projection behavior of E-conjunction∧ and E-implication⊃ (accounted for in [Hei83] , going back at least to Karttunen) The term presupposition has been applied to so many things that any account of it is likely to be contentious. What is at stake in the present paper is the claim that failures in translation are interesting, as are the adjustments (to L•-models) made before, during or after translation. The present shift in presupposition satisfaction from the realm of semantics ( [Hei83] ) to the construction algorithm is compatible not only with the presupposition-as-anaphora view of [San92] but also with the familiarity condition of [Hei82] .
As formulated above, (Weak), (Ref) and (Cut) imply contraction and exchange 
As for Stage, let us embed the set Φ of logical forms in the set E of inputs to translation, with the understanding that Stage keeps the logical forms fixed, and contains the pair ( , ) -i.e.,
The assumption (a • ) says that every logical form ϕ in Φ can be obtained unambiguously and without risk of presupposition failure by choosing an appropriate input, conveniently named ϕ. This re-use of ϕ is perhaps confusing, but otherwise harmless. Now, applying∧ to combine any finite number of logical forms entailed at a certain stage into one, and⊃ to anticipate logical forms entailed at a next stage, we get 
For a fixed entailment relation | − satisfying (a| −), it suffices to strengthen (A1)-(A3) to the scheme
Observe that adding E = Φ to (a • ) and (a| −) would validate the commuting squares e e A ≡ e e A in [MV97] . Our analysis of ambiguity and presupposition, however, depends on inputs E to Stage going beyond the outputs Φ -or more to the point: on Stage being unrulier than a function (let alone a bijection). Such leaps, called accommodation in the presupposition literature, can be quite tricky, subject, as they are, to various constraints such as consistency and plausibility which may or may not be amenable to formalization. Without settling which leaps are legitimate, we can nonetheless survey the possibilities by expanding L • to a language L, the models of which are formed from families of L • -models ( [Fer99b] ). Indexing a family of L • -models by a set I, the idea is to expose the heretofore implicit contextual parameter 
Plan of present paper
for all ϕ ∈ Φ * , ϕ ∈ Φ and e ∈ E * . The adjustment would be no different werê e uttered instead of¬ê. But suppose we were to follow¬ê bẏ ¬'∃KoB' : Buganda has no king.
Or, for that matter, what if | − 0¬ '∃KoB'? Under such circumstances, utterinġ ¬ê at ( , ) 0 might be odd, but surely not outright contradictory the wayê would? Perhaps (5) is too strong and ought to be weakened to
where the L • -formula ¬¬'∃KoB' expresses the (syntactic) consistency of '∃KoB'. Then, assuming | − 0¬ '∃KoB',¬ê need not trigger a leap between L • -models. But if (as is eminently plausible) neither | − 0 '∃KoB' nor | − 0¬ '∃KoB', then a leap to (Stage 1 , | − 1 ) would run afoul of a subsequent utterance of¬'∃KoB'. For (6), we could leap instead to an
However, if after¬ê, we are told that the king of Buganda has curls (rather than¬'∃KoB'), then we get a contradiction in ( 
Leaps triggered by pre-and post-conditions

From denials to underspecification
Rather than leaping to conclusions that are defeasible, we might try to avoid non-monotonicity by minimizing any choices made, postponing these until the necessary contextual elements become available. Returning toê, for example, [San91] argues that¬ê can be used not only as an assertion, in which case (5) holds, but also as a denial , in which case it is not an assertion and not subject to (5). Assuming this argument were correct, the challenge becomes: what if we are told "the king of Buganda is not bald" but are unable to tell if the utterance is an assertion or a denial? Matters would be simple were we to restrict our inputs to representations for which the question "am I an assertion or a denial?" is answered. The problem is that inputs often come in the form of underspecified representations, and just how much of the underspecification we should try to resolve is tricky. Whether or not we should resolve only what would support monotonic semantic interpretation ([AC92]), it is natural to leave some underspecification, suggesting transitions
that feed outputs ϕ of α as inputs to β (to resolve some underspecification left over after α). While (7) drops the label e on e in (4), it also changes e, making it no more obvious to factor than (4). We shall see in section 4.
L-models and merged translations
Consider a family of L • -models (Stage α , | − α ) α∈I indexed by some set I. To allow the notion of logical form to vary with α, we will not assume that there is a single set Φ of logical forms on which every entailment relation | − α is defined. However, let us assume (as in (a • ) in §1.1) that all logical forms belong to E,
Factoring via merged translations
To factor an L-transition of the form (4) Note that (a + ) holds vacuously if there is just one index in I, the stage set of which is prefix-closed (a natural assumption for L • ). We get more than one index in I once we differentiate in L between different contextual assumptions α and β. From here, it is a small step to forming disjunctions of these assumptions -suggesting that I be closed under a binary function + such that for all α, β ∈ I, prefix-closure(Stage α ∪ Stage β ) = Stage α+β . In fact, (a + ) is weaker than this requirement, as (a + ) can also be met in one fell swoop by a prefix-closed "monster" index that is maximally underspecified/uncommitted/ignorant/indeterminate in that Stage = α∈I Stage α . At any rate, (a + ) allows us to factor ( e, ϕ) α e ( ee, ψψ) β , as
with an index γ mediating the transformation of α into β.
More generally, given e 1 · · · e n ∈ E * , let e 1 · · · e n be the regular language consisting of the string e 1 · · · e n and all other strings obtained from it by inserting any number of occurrences of − or ♦. That is,
where L is { − , ♦} * . The closure condition (a + ) on I validates the L-scheme
and, if, moreover, Stage α is prefix-closed for every α ∈ I, 
for A and B ∈ E where the set E of "existential" L-formulas A is generated by 
Processing layers of representations
To factor the transition ( e, ϕ) α ( ϕ, ψ) β , let us cheat a bit, and rewrite it as
where
→, we preserve not only the inputs e, but also the intuition that ϕ is the underspecified expression obtained from translating e using α, while ψ is its refinement from β. Now, we can factor ( e, ϕ) α 
Monotonic interpretation (adding translation to entailment)
The index α; β need not be introduced above through a global closure condition on I taking ; to be a total binary function on I. Instead, we might, as in category theory, conceive of ; as a partial operation that is defined only when certain conditions are met (matching domains and co-domains, etc). 
Conclusion
In closing, let us turn to the obvious question: what about an axiomatization of L, extending say that in §1.1? Short of establishing a completeness theorem (which I believe is within reach), I hope to have outlined what L ought to look like for such a theorem to be interesting. A distinctive feature of L is its representationalism, eschewing reductions of expressions in E to sets of possible worlds. In this connection, one further construct might be considered for Lviz. atomic L-formulas of the form ϕ, for ϕ ∈ E, marking explicit (as opposed to merely entailed) information inasmuch as ( e, ϕ) α || − ϕ iff ϕ is listed among ϕ .
Alternatively, ϕ might be reconceptualized as ♦ϕ for some modal operator ♦ expressing a transition from α to an index whose notion of entailment is look-up.
